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,:hroughout the history of professional sports, labor
disputes have been a major source of contention causing
disorder and strife within every professional sports league.'
Arbitration2 is the current form of dispute resolution,
designed and implemented by the professional sports leagues'
"collective bargaining agreements"' 3 to cope with increasing
labor conflicts in the professional sports industry.4 A primary
reason for the development of the collective bargaining
agreement and arbitration to resolve labor conflicts was the
escalation of strikes and lockouts arising out of labor
disputes.5 The result of such unresolved labor conflicts is
the loss of millions of dollars by both the owners and the
players of professional baseball teams.6 Major League Baseball
(hereinafter MLB), for example, has encountered more labor-
management disputes than any other professional sports
league.7 The extraordinary amount of labor disputes in MLB
can be attributed to MLB's collective bargaining agreement,
years of near total owner control of labor relations, and the
introduction of free agency.8 Arbitration provides an essential
and indispensable means by which professional sports leagues
can settle labor disputes expeditiously and economically
without either side resorting to strikes or lockouts."
In the early 1960s, arbitration entered the
professional sports arena as the preferred method for
resolving labor disputes.'0 Since its introduction into
professional sports, arbitration has been incorporated into
almost all collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore,
courts have regarded arbitration as the proper forum for
resolving labor disputes arising under the collective bargaining
agreement. I Consequently, arbitration is the primary forum
for resolving disputes between the players and the owners
concerning salaries. ' The major professional sports leagues
in the United States all employ arbitration to resolve salary
disputes; however, MLB has initiated a unique, and possibly
superior, form of arbitration called "final offer arbitration"
(hereinafter FOA). 3
Initially, this paper will briefly consider arbitration in
general and then discuss the evolution of FOA and its
implementation into MLB salary disputes. This paper will
thereafter analyze the praises and criticisms of FOA, and
establish that FOA is a superior mechanism for resolving
salary disputes in professional sports because the FOA system
is designed to facilitate negotiation and settlement rather
than to resolve the dispute subsequent to adversarial
hearings.
Arbitration is a form of adjudication where the
parties agree on a neutral decision maker who is neither a
judge nor an official from an administrative agency. This
decision-maker then renders a binding judgment on their
dispute. 4 No single definitive definition can perfectly describe
the various forms of arbitration, as there are many variants
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to the process." Generally, arbitration is an alternative to
litigation, where the parties, under contract or otherwise,
agree to arbitrate their dispute through 'non-judicial means."6
With few exceptions, arbitration hearings are not open to
the public. 7 When parties enter into an arbitration
agreement, they understand that the decision is binding
and cannot be appealed. 8
Prior to an arbitration proceeding, parties enter into
an agreement to arbitrate specific sources of contention. At
this time, parties have significant latitude to design the
procedures, substantive standards, and specifications of the
arbitration.'9 The parties may also jointly select the neutral
decision-maker. 0 As a
result, numerous new
systems of arbitration
have developed.2 ' These
systems are tailored by
the parties to meet their
own specific interests, and
often more closely t
resemble "mixed
processes" rather than P ___
arbitration.2 2  Mixed
processes combine
elements of the primary process, including negotiation,
mediation, fact finding, or adjudication. Primary processes
include court-annexed arbitration, summary jury trials, and
mediation-arbitration. Each of these processes, whether
court annexed or privately conjured,'borrows' components
from the various alternative dispute resolution processes
and applies them accordingly, in a more tailored fashion, to
the specific needs of the dispute.
The two prevalent types of arbitration employed
today are"interest arbitration21 3 and "grievance arbitration.2 4
Interest arbitration sets the terms of a contract arising under
a collective bargaining agreement.25 FOA is a type of interest
arbitration, and in MLB, replaces the strike or lockout with
the risk that a neutral third party will determine the
settlement.2 6 This risk can be a difference of millions of
dollars. For example, Player X submits his estimate of what
he believes he deserves as a salary, say $6 million per year,
and the Owner submits his number of $1.6 million per year.
The risk lies in the fact that the arbitrator can only choose
the player's number or the owner's number and cannot
negotiate a middle number. Both parties stand to lose huge
amounts of money as oftentimes these are multiple year
contracts.
Grievance arbitration,27 on the other hand, interprets
the terms of an agreement rather than setting those terms.28
Grievance arbitration is most analogous to labor arbitration
in the private sector, excluding salary arbitration. However,
in grievance arbitration, management seldom assigns the
arbitrator the power to set the terms of an agreement.29
Instead, the arbitrator interprets the terms of the agreement.
Conversely, in interest arbitration, the arbitrator is given
the power to set the agreement terms to avoid strikes while
resolving labor disputes over contract terms. 0
Arbitration is used primarily in commercial and labor
disputes via collective bargaining agreements in the areas of
injury, salary, discipline, and general disputes arising out of
the agreement terms.3 If the dispute is not one in the labor
context, it is generally considered one of commercial origin.32
In professional sports, both commercial and labor arbitration
are customary. Collective bargaining agreements in
professional sports provide for arbitration to settle
grievances, especially those concerning salary disputes.33
Historically, courts
defer to the
arbitrator's ruling in the
labor context unless it
is clear that the parties
n fspecifically intended
that the dispute not be
arbitrated. 4
Prior to 1984,
courts held a strong
presumption against
arbitration in the
commercial context primarily because of state statutory
limitations on commercial arbitration." However, in 1984,
the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act
governs both federal and state courts,"superceding conflicting
state statutes"'36 The Supreme Court mandated that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.. . ."7 A
"strong federal policy favoring arbitration" over litigation
remains in both the labor or commercial context when
contractual provisions provide for "arbitrability" of claims.38
As a result, arbitration has become "the modus
operandi for maintaining stability and industrial peace"39 in
the professional sports industry. When an arbitrator rules
on a dispute arising out of a collective bargaining agreement
or implicating the National Labor Relations Act,4° courts will
almost always honor the decision.4 If the four criteria
justifying arbitration are met, a court will not overturn an
arbitrator's ruling. These criteria are: (I) the grievance
proceeding must be fair; (2) the parties must have agreed to
be bound by the arbitration decision; (3) the arbitrator's
decision must be consistent with the NLRA and in no way
contravene its purposes and policies; and (4) the issues
presented by the alleged unfair labor practice must have been
part of the case before the arbitrator.4 Arbitration in
professional sports has deterred strikes and lockouts by
providing a viable, expedient and efficient resolution of
disputes between players and clubs. Following the Supreme
Court's support of the process, arbitration became the
preferred method resolving labor disputes in professional
sports.
FOA, as used by MLB, exemplifies how parties can
construct a unique process geared towards their specific
needs.43 Baseball's salary arbitration process surfaced, in part,
as a response to the unprecedented amount of labor disputes
within the MLB and the resulting turmoil. The extraordinary
amounts of disputes in MLB surfaced, primarily, in response
to the collective bargaining agreements, and predominantly
concerned players' salaries. Baseball arbitration can be traced
back to procedures used in negotiating labor management
disputes in unionized sectors.' The process of FOA was
originally introduced as a mechanism for resolving labor
disputes in the 1940s to circumvent the Taft-Hartley Act's
4
national emergency dispute procedures.
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&oBefore Arbitraion Was a Part of
Major League Baseball
The excessive number of labor disputes in MLB, due
to the extreme power maintained by the owners over the
players' careers for most of this century, necessitated a
revamping of the leagues' labor dispute resolution practices.
Prior to the current arbitration method employed by MLB,
the owners used a'board of arbitration' to deal with league
policy concerns. 47 This board, however, was not impartial
because it was an "instrument of baseball's management."'48
MLB's owners had total power in determining what salary a
player would get once he signed with the team.49 The advent
of the "reserve clause" was a reason for the owners' total
power, and was further augmented by MLB's antitrust
exemption. 0
The reserve clause gave owners "the option of
renewing a player's contract ad infinitum at a salary determined
by the owner."'" The reserve clause was implemented in
every baseball player's contract from the 1880s until the
1970s52 when it was finally discarded after years of litigation,
arbitration and collective bargaining.53 Prior to the
nullification of the reserve clause, players had only two
options if they did not agree with their contract.5 4 They
could either continue to play for their current owner or
they could retire from the game altogether.55
The reserve clause was only the beginning of the
owners' monopolistic rule of MLB.5' In FederalBaseball Club
of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs,17 the plaintiff, an opposing league to MLB, challenged
MLB's reserve clause. Plaintiff alleged that MLB "conspired
to monopolize the baseball business"5 8 because players could
not get out of their contracts, and thus, could not sign with
their league. 9 Finding in favor of the defendant, the Court
effectively exempted MLB from antitrust laws.6° The Court
stated, "that which in its consummation is not commerce
does not become commerce among the States" simply
because the teams cross state lines for their exhibitions and
induce their players to do so.6 ' Therefore,the charges "against
the defendants were not an interference with commerce
among the States."62 Consequently, MLB became the only
professional sports league in the United States to enjoy
antitrust exemption.63 This ruling laid the foundation for the
future chaos erupting within MLB concerning player salary
disputes and the eventual strikes and lockouts faced by the
league.1
4
Two subsequent cases heard by the Supreme Court
regarding MLB's antitrust exemption reinforced that
exemption. In Toolson v. NewYork Yankees, Inc.,6 the Court
held that the decision to overturn MLB's antitrust exemption
rests in Congress' dominion. 6 In that case, plaintiff alleged
that MLB team owners violated antitrust laws.6'7 Toolson
played for the NewYorkYankees. 68 He refused to report to
spring training, and subsequently, other league owners would
not sign him to their roster.'9 Toolson claimed that MLB
attempted to monopolize professional baseball and
maintained unjust restraints on players by way of the reserve
clause.70 In a per curium decision, the court stated that
"Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws."'
In Flood v. Kuhn,72 the Supreme Court once again
upheld MLB's antitrust exemption. Flood challenged MLB's
anti-trust exemption after he was traded to the Philadelphia
Phillies by the St. Louis Cardinals. 73 He refused to play with
the Phillies that season, planning to sign with another team
following the end of the season.4 The Court stated that
although professional baseball is indeed a business involved
in interstate commerce, it is in a "very distinct sense, an
exception and an anomaly." Therefore, MLB may enjoy an
exemption from antitrust laws. However, other professional
sports are not permitted to enjoy this same exemption.75
The Court's decision "rests on recognition and an acceptance
of baseball's unique characteristics and needs" and the lack
of action by Congress to overturn the exemption.7'
This antitrust exemption has been a major source
of contention in MLB, but neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has overturned the rulings of Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc., Toolson or Flood.77 Consequently,"litigation
has proven to be an ineffective forum for players in their
attempt to equalize their bargaining position with the
owners." 7 The players had to find alternative methods to
achieve their goals. 79 Unionization, negotiation and collective
bargaining became the means by which players leveled the
bargaining field. 0 In search of means to overcome MLB's
antitrust exemption, the players' union appointed Marvin
Miller as president of the Major League Players'Association. 8'
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Marvin Miller then sought and acquired recognition of the
players' union's bargaining status by the National Labor
Relations Board in 1969.82 Finally, the players found equal
bargaining power and a means to effectuate change in MLB's
labor system. 3 The players achieved equal bargaining power
through labor laws when the antitrust laws failed them.
8 4
o Ente~rbi~-ai and Collective
[araiing
In 1972, the players organized a strike which finally
caught the owners' attention.85 As a result, in 1973, the
players incorporated a salary arbitration clause in the 1973
Collective Bargaining Agreement. This clause stated that if
players and owners could not reach an agreement concerning
the player's salary, an outside arbitrator would resolve the
dispute.8 6 In 1975, the reserve clause was virtually nullified
during an arbitration hearing with Andy Messersmith, then
of the Los Angeles Dodgers.
Messersmith challenged MLB's reserve clause by way
of grievance arbitration.87 Messersmith played out his renewal
contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers. Following the end
of the season, Messersmith sought to sign with another team
in the league. 8 Every team in the league refused to bid for
his services because they assumed that he 'belonged to the
Dodgers.'89 In reaction, Messersmith invoked the grievance
arbitration process agreed to in the collective bargaining
agreement, alleging that the renewal clause only renewed
his services for one additional year" The owners countered
that if a team renews a player's contract under the same
terms as the original contract, the original contract's renewal
terms are incorporated in the renewed contract.9' Thus,
the owners claimed that the contract conferred perpetual
rights of renewal to the team.9 2 The arbitrator ruled for
Messersmith, noting that the renewal clause only gave the
team the right to one additional year of service. 9'
Consequently, the ruling permitted any player who plays out
his renewal term to become a free agent. 4 The decision set
the stage for player free agency in MLB.93 However, the
owners did not take this decision lightly and appealed the
judgment to the courts.9 6 A federal district court, supported
by a federal appeals court,
upheld the decision,




decision and the Y
establishment of free 
p
agency, labor dispute
disorder in MLB became f
the norm.98 Salaries M
skyrocketed from an
average of $5 1,501 in
1975 to $76,066 in 1976
and $371,157 in 1985. 9 Player strikes and/or lockouts
became a regular practice over the next couple of years."
The 1981 MLB season saw the first midseason strike, the
third in baseball's history, and cost the players, the owners,
the cities, and related businesses extraordinary amounts of
money.1"' However, the players finally became a force to be
reckoned with and collective bargaining became the tool by
which baseball's future would be shaped. 02
The launch of free agency and salary arbitration
resulted in new tensions between the players and owners.
Players attained substantial bargaining power and a veritable
means for resolving salary disputes. 3 Owners resented
the increase in players' salaries, blaming it on the
implementation of salary arbitration."4 Consequently, the
owners continuously undertake to abolish the clause, while
the players persistently refuse to negotiate it away."'5 The
1990 Basic Agreement was implemented by the league in
1990 after a thirty-two day spring training lockout that
resulted from contentious discussions regarding salary
arbitration eligibility issues and the possible salary cap. These
issues concerned whether players in their second year could
be eligible for salary arbitration. The player's sought eligibility
for salary arbitration for players in their second year of
employment. The owners desired to limit salary arbitration
only to players who have at least completed three years of
service in MLB. This agreement set player eligibility for salary
arbitration below the three year level, increased management
pension contributions, and raised the minimum salary to
$100,000.06
Yet the players went on strike again in 1994 after
tensions between the players and owners over controlling
salary negotiations and free agency peaked."' 7 The strike
culminated in the close of the season and the cancellation of
theWorld Series for the first time since 1904.108 In order to
abate the strike, on March 31, 1995,Judge Sonia Sotomayor
ordered an injunction forcing the owners to reinstate the
free agency/reserve systems and its salary arbitration
provisions of the 1990 Basic Agreement."' 9 Consequently,
since the origins of baseball arbitration, as exemplified by
the final outcome in 1995, the arbitration proceedings
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concerning salary disputes have been refined dramatically
and the integration of FOA has set MLB salary arbitration
apart from the rest of professional sports.' 'The purpose of
MLB's salary arbitration process was to provide an alternative
to strike and lockouts in the league.'
Final offer, or last-best offer, arbitration was designed
to induce settlement between the parties as an alternative
to strikes and lockouts." 2 First, the process requires that
the arbitrator choose either the player's proposal or the
owner's offer.' "There is no room for the arbitrator to choose
a number between the offers or compromise in any way."
4
Great risk is therefore involved if the parties do not come
to an agreement before the arbitrator awards a salary.'"
Final offer arbitration encourages players and owners to
negotiate in good faith and compromise in order to avoid
leaving the decision up to the arbitrator." 6 To meet those
ends, both players and owners in negotiating the collective
bargaining agreement determine the criteria to invoke salary
arbitration and what arbitrators may consider in rendering
a decision.
C. Criteria and Procedures for
Salary Arbitration in Major League
Baseball
Crucial components of salary arbitration provisions
in collective bargaining agreements relate to: who is eligible
for salary arbitration, who the arbitrators are, how many
arbitrators preside over the hearing, and what criteria the
arbitrator may take into consideration when making his or
her determination." 7 Presently, in regard to salary arbitration,
the collective bargaining agreement permits all players with
three to six years of major league service to be eligible for
salary arbitration." 8 Players with more than six years of
service must acquire their team's consent prior to filing for
salary arbitration." 9 The agreement also permits certain
players, known as the super twos, with more than two years
but less than three years of service, to use salary arbitration
if they have "accumulated at least 86 days of service during
the immediately prior season" and "ranks in the top




The procedures for MLB salary arbitration
commences after the World Series.' 2' The MLB Players
Association (hereinafter MLBPA) and the owners' Player
Relations Committee (hereinafter PRC) mutually select a
panel of three arbitrators from a roster of approximately
twenty-four arbitrators provided by theAmerican Arbitration
Panel. 122The number of arbitrators, as a result of the collective
bargaining process, had changed from a single arbitrator to a
panel of three arbitrators in 2000-2001. The bargaining
compromise increasing the panel to three went in favor of
the clubs. A single arbitrator is cheaper, and therefore, favored
by the players. However, the clubs desired a panel of three
because of a lack of trust in a single arbitrator who may be
motivated by retaining his or her position, whereas, a three
arbitrator panel with confidential voting would guarantee
impartial decisions unhampered by personal employment
motives.'23 The arbitrators are seasoned in MLB salary
arbitration and labor grievance cases. 24 Once a player is
eligible for salary arbitration, he may file for arbitration
between January I and January 15.121 Subsequently, once
salary arbitration is invoked, the MLBPA and the PRC notify
the arbitrators when they will be needed for the hearings. 26
The salary arbitrations are then held between February I
and February 20. Arbitrators are paid a flat fee of $750 for
each scheduled case.' 27 The costs are split between the player
and the club.'28 The arbitrators are not informed of which
player's case they will hear.
29
MLB arbitration is "last best offer" or FOA. The
two sides each have one hour to state their position followed
by a thirty minute rebuttal period.' The arbitrators
announce their decision within twenty-four hours without
any written opinion.'3 ' The decision is binding and not open
to appeal. The decisions are publicized throughout the season
rather than being announced simultaneously at the end of
the season.32 The arbitration process as a whole is not kept
confidential; however, the contents of communications within
the arbitration and the reason for the decision are not
publicized because the arbitrators do not write an opinion.
Confidentiality lends to a more communicative discussion
of interests often assisting in the resolution process.
The collective bargaining agreement also catalogs
what criteria may be considered by the arbitrators when
making a decision. ArticleVI, Section (F) (12) of Major League
Baseball's Basic Agreement provides the criteria (a list of ten
factors) which arbitrators may or may not consider in
rendering their decisions.'33 This provision states:
(A) The criteria will be the quality of the Player's
contribution to his Club during the past season
(including but not limited to his overall performance,
special qualities of leadership and public appeal), the
length and consistency of his career contribution, the
record of the Player's past compensation, comparative
baseball salaries . .. , the existence of any physical or
mental defects on the part of the Player, and the recent
performance record of the Club including but not
limited to its League standing and attendance as an
indication of public acceptance ....
(B) Evidence of the following shall not be admissible:
(i)The financial position of the Player and the Club;
(ii) Press comments, testimonials or similar material
bearing on the performance of either the Player
or the Club, except that recognized annual Player
awards for playing excellence shall not be excluded;
(iii) Offers made by either Player or Club prior to
arbitration;
(iv) The cost to the parties of their representatives,
attorneys, etc.;
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(v) Salaries in other sports or occupations. 3 4
MLB has tailored this aspect of the collective
bargaining agreement to best serve its needs as a professional
sports league by omitting the possibility for consideration
of terms without the agreement and specifically pre-
determining what criteria the arbitrators may consider.
However, the agreement does not specify how much weight
an arbitrator must give to any of the provisions."'
Consequently, the parties instruct the arbitrators to allocate
"such weight to the evidence as shall appear appropriate
under the circumstances."'36 For example, the weight given
to the player's performance versus that of comparable
players' salaries is up to the arbitrators' discretion. This
may be problematic in that more discretion is given to the
arbitrator in determining how to weigh certain variables
and, therefore, may result in incongruous determinations.
Accordingly, salary arbitration provides the players with a
viable alternative to having the owners dictate their salaries
by assigning the decision to a neutral third party who will
objectively weigh the player's true market value.1
7
Prais and Crtiis
FOA salary arbitration in MLB is a typical example
of interest arbitration.'38 Parties often settle the dispute
prior to arbitrator's decision because FOA restricts the ability
of the arbitrator to compromise between the parties' final
offers. In effect,"baseball's arbitration is a process designed
never to be used"' 39 The process consequently leads to a
high-cost/high-risk situation for the parties if they do not
resolve the dispute themselves. 40 As a result, in comparison
to conventional arbitration, FOA fosters negotiated
settlement by the parties prior to the arbitration hearing. 4
A. Fin;al Offer Arbitration v. Con'
ventional Arbitration
Conventional arbitration is a process where "a
bargaining impasse is submitted to an arbitrator who selects
either party's position on one or all of the pending issues,
compromises between the parties' positions or awards a
unique solution."'142 Therefore, an arbitrator in the
conventional arbitration context has more discretion in
deciding the outcome of a dispute. Parties to conventional
arbitration believe that the arbitrator will more probably
compromise between the two positions than go with one of
the parties' proposals. 43 This alleviates the extreme risk
incurred by FOA. That is, the arbitrator may choose the
other party's number, which often deviates from the first
party's offer by millions of dollars. Parties are less disposed
to good faith negotiations when they believe that a better
outcome may result from the arbitrator's decision, 144 and
they often undervalue the











process. 146 Consequently, conventional arbitration alleviates
parties' fear of an outright loss and effectually undercuts the
motivation to bargain in good faith and propose realistic
offers prior to arbitration.
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The inevitable risk in FOA is that the arbitrator can
pick between one of only two positions; this acts as a
"psychological, economic and political incentive" for parties
to negotiate in good faith and resolve the dispute on their
own.148 In effect, the risk of losing the arbitration neutralizes
the "chilling effect" created by conventional arbitration upon
parties' willingness to negotiate in good faith. 49 In the
context of labor disputes, arbitration acts as an instrument
for negotiated settlement and not as the primary tool for
settling salary' 0 disputes because of the high risk in letting
the arbitrator render a final decision, which may not be your
number.
B. Final Offer Arbitration Fosters
Negotiation and Self Party
Resolution
FOA encourages settlement by the parties for a
number of reasons. First, parties are motivated to settle
because of the incentive to avoid the extreme risk associated
with FOA. I" Second, the parties rationally bargain in good
faith in order to resolve the dispute on their own, thereby
engendering a presentation of their most reasonable position
to the other party prior to the hearing.5 2 Moreover, the
arbitrator's inability to compromise eradicates unreasonable
negotiating positions.5 3 Third, as figures are proposed
simultaneously by the parties, 114 they cannot evaluate the
opposing party's offer and thereafter propose a counter offer
SPORTS
based on that evaluation.'
The fourth incentive to settle the dispute prior to
the hearing is based upon the distributive properties of salary
arbitration. FOA's reasonable final offers provide a midpoint
and a range of numbers to focus the negotiations when
numbers are the only issue. 6 Each side can judge how the
arbitrator will value the disputed item, which helps the parties
predict which offer the arbitrator will choose. 7 The offer
closest to the arbitrator's value is likely to win the arbitration,
and the parties then settle accordingly.'58 Prior to the FOA
hearing and the arbitrator's decision, the parties were aware
of the midpoint number and could effectively evaluate
whether the player was worth more or less than the
midpoint.'5 9 Consequently, this numbers game provided a
negotiable midpoint that promotes settlement. 60 If the
parties' positions were considerably different, the parties
had an economic incentive to settle. 6 ' Thus, in FOA, where
the discrepancy between the numbers is large, increasing
the risk of allowing the arbitrator render a decision, the
parties can focus on the midpoint number. This midpoint
number now becomes the negotiable number from which
the parties can better evaluate the strength of their positions
fostering party negotiation and settlement. On the other
hand, if the parties' proposals were close together, the
midpoint number may be an agreeable number, or the parties
could more easily compromise to find an amenable number.
6
1
The fifth motivation for the parties to settle the
dispute on their own terms is predicated upon interest-based
incentives. One advantage of settling the dispute is to
circumvent the mutual costs of the arbitration process. In
addition, the parties can generate a mutually beneficial
settlement while including non-salary terms in the agreement.
In negotiation for settlement agreements, the parties can
fashion creative solutions for a win-win resolution to the
dispute. Players are more inclined to settle because they
can contract to secure benefits such as bonuses, no trade
clauses, guaranteed contracts, multi-year deals, or other more
imaginative clauses including single occupancy rooms on road
trips or initial payment of hotel charges rather than
reimbursement. 63 Furthermore, the prospect of a multi-
year contract ensures job security, which is a very strong
motivation for players to avoid salary arbitration.'64
Clubs are motivated to settle for similar reasons. If
the parties do go to arbitration, the club will likely assume a
litigious and confrontational posture. 6  Clubs frequently
assert arguments criticizing the player's past record, physical
or mental defects, playing record, public appeal and his
contributions to the team. 66 This can only complicate the
relationship, whereas settlement may actually foster positive,
future relations between the two parties.1 67 The clubs could
very well be interested in signing a multi-year contract with
the player to ensure future services. 68 In contrast, if the
parties wait for the arbitrator's decision, the standard
contract following the arbitration is for only one year at
specified salary.6 9 Accordingly, due to the risks involved in
allowing the arbitrator to render a final judgment, and the
other incentives to negotiate and settle, ninety percent of
baseball salary arbitration cases are settled prior to the
hearing itself. 70 As a principle purpose of FOA is to foster
negotiation and settlement prior to the final judgment, FOA
is indeed a successful process.
C. Criticisms of Final Offer
Arbitration in Major League
Baseball
One criticism of MLB's use of FOA is that it has
effectively led to significant increases in players' salaries -
even for mediocre players.'7' The current system of salary
arbitration seems to unfairly favor the players because owners
are "obligated to participate if a player qualifies, have no
control over what they will pay their players, and [it] results
in budget-busting salaries.' 72 Hence, it would seem that the
owners are in a lose-lose situation.' 73 Even though its purpose
is to avoid strikes and lockouts, MLB's salary arbitration
system has become a major source of contention and discord
and sometimes results in both. However, prior to the
implementation of the salary arbitration system, MLB still
saw strikes and lockouts arising out of salary disputes. After
the implementation of salary arbitration, strikes and lockouts
concerned the terms of the salary arbitration system itself
rather than specific player salaries.' 74 For example,the players
went on strike in 1985 due to unresolved issues regarding
the salary cap and arbitration. 7 1 Moreover, in 1990, the
owners instituted a lockout over the same issues for thirty-
two days. 
76
A second criticism of FOA, known as the "narcotic
effect:' is prevalent in any form of arbitration. 77 The narcotic
effect basically motivates parties who have previously relied
upon the system to use it exclusively to solve future disputes
and impasses. Research has determined that this
phenomenon is a customary result in FOA because parties
who have employed FOA make use of the system more
readily than those who use conventional arbitration. 78 It
can be argued that this is so because the process yields
positive results,thus, players who have experienced it choose
to invoke the process again, seeking to once again achieve a
negotiated settlement and increasing their salaries.
A third criticism is that FOA stimulates
gamesmanship; 79 that parties tend to concentrate on
predicting the mindset of the arbitrator instead of attempting
to resolve the dispute. 80 Salary arbitration becomes a"battle
ground of statistics,"'' where the party that can structure
the stronger line of reasoning, based on the numbers, wins
the case.'82 This argument is often tailored to appease the
arbitrator while detracting from the prospect of a negotiated
settlement. In addition, limiting the subject matter for
determination by a neutral third party to just salary may
restrict the prospect for settlement. 3
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The criticisms of FOA can be attributed to other
variants within MLB, or are simply misdirected. MLB is a
business worth millions, even billions of dollars. To attribute
the increase in salaries solely to the implementation of salary
arbitration is simplistically misleading.'" Moreover, as the
next section will demonstrate, the narcotic effect in the
baseball context has actually led to an increasing amount
of negotiated settlement, and has had a receding effect on
the number of strikes and lockouts in the league.
Furthermore, even though gamesmanship may occur in
FOA, the evidence still suggests that the process is
successful and parties predominantly settle their disputes
rather than moving to arbitration.
D. Responses to Criticisms
Although FOA in MLB is one possible source of the
enormous increase in players' salaries, the clubs have won
236 out of 417 cases that have reached arbitration since
1974.1 The rise in player salaries can also been attributed
to inflation, increases in free agents, the enormous surplus
attained through multi-million dollar television contracts, the
profits returned from ticket sales, merchandise, and even
skyboxes. 86 Prior to salary arbitration, players' salaries were
artificially low under the reserve clause. 8 7 Moreover, in
contrast to the notion that salary arbitration is the cause of
salary inflation, "compensation for players eligible for salary
arbitration, however, has remained almost stable over the
past six years while free agent salaries have ballooned in the
competitive free market.'"88 Accordingly, it is possible to
contend that FOA has effectively controlled salary inflation
where owners in the free market scenario could not.'89 The
statistics demonstrate that the current method of salary
arbitration in MLB has served its moderating purpose well. 90
There are no holdouts by those players who are eligible for
salary arbitration as opposed to players in other professional
sports.' 9' The cases are resolved expeditiously, and the
players all report to their spring training. 92
As previously noted, the narcotic effect is prevalent
in all forms of arbitration. 93 Although there is a discernible
narcotic effect in FOA, research demonstrates that FOA is
implemented a great deal more often than FOA hearings. 94
The implementation of FOA therefore facilitates negotiation
and settlement.95 Parties may invoke the process more often
than the other forms of arbitration, but they also, in the
FOA process, settle prior to the hearing more often than
other forms of arbitration. 96 Thus, by way of the narcotic
effect, the process results in the settlement of more
disputes.
97
Finally, even if FOA promotes gamesmanship by the
parties, the process nevertheless "encourages
reasonable final offers that facilitate
settlement."' 98 In MLB, players and clubs are
motivated to settle before the arbitration
hearing.'99 Moreover, the fact that it is simply
a numbers game provides the parties with a
more readily negotiable figure, once the
midpoint is determined in negotiations prior
to the FOA hearing."00 Taking both the praise
and criticism of FOA into consideration, the
current system employed by MLB truly works. The system
is an exceptional and superior dispute resolution process
that provides an expeditious alternative to litigation while
alleviating the costly, time-consuming, and bitter results that
often accompany other forms of arbitration.
Historical conflicts in MLB throughout its history
mandate a system that can readily manage the over abundance
of disputes. FOA is the appropriate system for MLB salary
disputes because it fosters party negotiation and good faith
bargaining that frequently results in settlement rather than
actual arbitration.20' The purpose of FOA is to do just that,
and the process has done an extraordinary job in achieving
its objective20 2 More than eighty percent of cases filed for
arbitration in MLB are settled before the hearing.
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Conversely, even if the parties cannot settle prior to the
arbitration, the system affords an expeditious, informal and
final resolution for the parties.2 4 Chart A205 demonstrates
that FOA is a truly effective process for encouraging
negotiation and party settlement prior to the arbitration.
According to the statistics, players have filed well
over two thousand claims for salary arbitration, but only
four-hundred twelve of those cases actually entered the
process. Salary arbitration, therefore, is an effective process
that fosters party negotiation and, eventually, settlement.
On the other hand, even though the majority of cases
are settled before the actual hearing takes place, the average
rise in player salary has increased. Owners claim that FOA
is the primary and sole cause of the inflated salaries of MLB
players in the past thirty years.20 6 Salaries have indeed inflated
greatly since the inception of salary arbitration in MLB.
207
Yet salary arbitration has actually kept the players' salaries
in check. Chart B demonstrates that, between the years of
1991 and 1998, the average player salary has remained
relatively stable since 1993.
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CHART B: Average Salary Figures for Players with three and four years of Major



















According to the above chart, player salaries have
not increased for those players with three and four years
of major league service since 1994. Thus, when examining
the entire scope of the financial framework of MLB, the
relative salaries have not increased as dramatically as critics
claim.208 The adverse affect of player salary inflation can be
attributed to other variables in MLB, such as inflation, free
agency, surplus from television contracts, increased ticket
sales, merchandizing, etc.209 Moreover, owners do not have
to renew the contract of a player who files for salary
arbitration. °10 The owners have the ability to cut the player
instead of participating in arbitration that may lead to a higher
salary.2' If the owners feel that it is not worth it to participate
in salary arbitration, they can forego keeping the player on










Salary arbitration plays an essential role in the overall
machinery of MLB. The system affords a viable alternative
to litigation and more importantly to league strikes and
lockouts. The players are able to contest their salary disputes,
and the owners are able to maintain an operating
organization. Taken as a whole, FOA certainly manages to
keep MLB intact. Hundreds of cases are filed for arbitration
yearly, however, almost all of them settle prior to the hearing.
Given that MLB will continue to procure millions of dollars
in revenue annually, that free agents will compete on the
market, and that salary disputes will inevitably continue, MLB's
system of FOA is ultimately the most dependable and efficient
system to maintain stability in the league.
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